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Y. G. Tan 
 
 Concepts are the constituents of thoughts, which in turn, are the 
contents of propositional attitudes. They are also what the predicates of our 
language express. According to a tradition going back to Plato, questions 
about comparative content – questions of the form “Is concept F the same 
as concept G?” – are purely about relations of ideas, and so are answerable a 
priori. This does not mean that no experience at all is necessary to answer 
such questions, for experience may be needed to grasp their content. Call a 
piece of information about Fs extraneous if it is not required to obtain a 
proper understanding of the concept F. Then what the traditional 
assumption says is that no extraneous information is necessary to answer a 
question about comparative content. Henceforth, I shall refer to this 
assumption about concepts as the transparency thesis, or T for short. 
  
In recent years, an account of mental content known as externalism 
has been gaining increasing acceptance among philosophers. According to 
this account, the contents of a person’s propositional attitudes – beliefs, 
desires, hopes, – are partly determined by factors in his social and physical 
environment, of which he may have no knowledge. A quick survey of the 
current literature indicates that there is a strong convergence of opinion, 
among philosophers on both sides of the externalist-internalist divide, 
regarding the connection between externalism and T. As Falvey and Owens 
put it, “There is no question but that externalism is incompatible with 
introspective knowledge of comparative content. …Given externalism, there 
is simply no reason to suppose that a subject should be capable of making 
correct judgments of comparative content if he lacks the relevant empirical 
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knowledge.” (p. 110-111 [5]) Hilary Putnam, Colin McGinn, Tyler Burge 
and others have made similar claims. 
 
 It is not my aim in this paper to defend T. My concern is only to 
consider and answer the question “Is externalism compatible with T?” I 
believe that the matter is not as clear-cut as it may seem to those 
philosophers who answer the question negatively. Not every form of 
externalism, I shall argue, is incompatible with T. In particular, the 
externalism that is warranted by the standard Twin-Earth arguments is 
neutral with respect to T. I argue for this claim in section (I) and (II). If I 
am right, then Putnam’s argument in The Meaning of “Meaning” against 
what he calls the traditional theory of meaning – the theory that meanings 
are in the head – is inconclusive. For T provides one good sense in which 
concepts (and hence meanings) are in the head. I pick up this point in 
section (III). 
 
I 
 
 It is possible to distinguish two types of argument for content 
externalism. The first type of argument depends essentially on the 
assumption that a person can have a propositional attitude even if he lacks a 
complete grasp of some concept in its content. Suppose A, whose use of the 
word ‘arthritis’ has so far been unexceptional, now comes to affirm “My 
arthritis has spread to my thigh.” Since arthritis is specifically an 
inflammation of joints, this shows that A’s understanding of the word 
‘arthritis’ is defective. Nevertheless, this need not prevent us from 
attributing to A the (false) belief that he has arthritis in his thigh. Now 
imagine a counterfactual situation in which A’s physical and mental histories 
(non-intensionally described) are exactly the same but the word ‘arthritis’ is 
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used in the linguistic community for various forms of rheumatoid ailments 
including the one in A’s thigh. If this situation were actual, A would not 
have any beliefs whose contents involved the concept arthritis. He would 
not, for instance, have the belief that he has arthritis in his thigh; in its place 
would be a belief that could be true. It follows that the contents of a 
person’s propositional attitudes are not independent of the linguistic and 
social conventions that exist within his community. For convenience, I shall 
refer to this form of externalism as externalism1. 
  
But we can accept the conclusion of this argument without having to 
abandon T. Let arthritis* be the concept that is expressed by ‘arthritis’ in the 
counterfactual situation. Then surely no experience other than what is 
required for a proper understanding of the concepts arthritis and arthritis* is 
necessary for knowing that they are different concepts. Thus, if someone 
unfamiliar with the word ‘arthritis’ were given two explanations of its 
meaning, one in accordance with the concept arthritis and the other in 
accordance with the concept arthritis*, he would know that they cannot both 
be correct. For the argument to entail the falsity of T, it must imply that 
some of our concepts have identity conditions that are not fully determined 
by our linguistic practices. But the present argument does not have this 
implication. Therefore, we may safely conclude that the externalism1 is not 
incompatible with T. 
  
However, to be fair to Falvey and Owens, T is not the thesis that 
they have in mind when they claim that “externalism is incompatible with a 
priori knowledge of comparative content.” The target of their arguments is a 
stronger version of T which I shall designate T’: 
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(T’) With respect to any two of his thoughts or beliefs, an individual can  
 know authoritatively and directly (that is, without relying on  
 inferences from his observed environment) whether or not they have  
 the same content. (p. 109-110 [5]) 
 
According to Falvey and Owens, T’ is false if externalism1 is true. 
The following is a variation of one of their arguments. Suppose there is a 
community L* which actually uses ‘arthritis’ to mean arthritis*, and suppose 
A is a frequent visitor to L*. Then, according to externalism1, the content of 
some of A’s propositional attitudes will change when he moves between L* 
and his own community L. When A is in his own community L, some of his 
thoughts will contain the concept arthritis but none will contain the concept 
arthritis*. When he is in L*, the situation will be reversed. Now suppose A is 
asked, shortly after his return from L*, whether, when he utters the sentence 
“Arthritis is ___” he expresses the same thought that he expressed when he 
uttered the same sentence last week. Presumably, A will answer yes. But if 
he was in L* last week, then he will be mistaken. And clearly, nothing that is 
accessible to A through introspection alone will reveal his mistake to him. 
Therefore T’ is false.  
  
Although this argument seems persuasive, it is nevertheless fallacious. 
Let us assume that A will answer the question affirmatively if he relies solely 
on introspective evidence. Let us also grant that A will be mistaken if he 
answers affirmatively. None of this, however, is enough to yield the 
conclusion of the argument. The crucial question we need to ask is whether 
A’s mistake is one that would be excluded by T’. I shall argue that A’s 
affirmative response cannot have the meaning that the argument reads into 
it. Consequently A’s case is not a counterexample to T’. 
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Given A’s answer, we may infer that A believes that when he utters 
the sentence “Arthritis is ___”, the thought that he expresses with it is the 
same as the thought he expressed last week with the same sentence. Let p be 
the thought A now expresses and q be the thought he expressed last week. 
Since p and q are different thoughts, A’s belief is false. However, for A’s 
case to be a counterexample to T’, A’s belief must rest upon a judgment 
about the content of p and q. For otherwise, there will be no mistake about 
comparative content to hold up against T’. 
  
It is essential to note that not every judgment of the form “X and Y 
are (are not) the same thought” is a judgment of comparative content in the 
sense used in the various transparency theses. If I affirm, on good authority, 
that the thought expressed by a certain Finnish sentence is the same as the 
thought expressed by a certain Polish sentence, I have made a judgment 
concerning two thoughts. But since I do not understand either of the 
sentences, my judgment is not a judgment of comparative content in the 
sense required by T and T’. In this sort of judgments, the Xs and Ys must 
themselves be thoughts, nor just names or descriptions of thoughts. Thus 
for A’s case to be a genuine counterexample to T’, A’s mistake must rest 
upon a judgment in which both p and q figure as parts of the content. 
  
Now it might be argued that A’s belief must involve precisely such a 
judgment because he can only arrive at the belief by thinking as follows:  
 
(a1)  p is the thought I express now with S (where S = “Arthritis is ___”). 
(a2) q was the thought I expressed last week with S. 
(a3) p and q have the same content. 
(a4) So the thought I express now with S is the same as the thought I 
expressed last week with S. 
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The judgment that p and q have the same content is thus part of the 
justification of A’s mistaken belief. 
  
But this contention is unsustainable, first, because there are other 
ways for A to arrive at his belief, and second and more importantly, because 
the line of reasoning it ascribes to A is one which, in the context of the 
externalist framework that informs the discussion, A cannot pursue. 
  
To take the second point first, it should be noted that the embedding 
context of A’s false belief is his home community L. By the argument’s own 
assumptions, the concept arthritis* is one which does not exist in L. In 
particular, it is a concept which A does not have when he is in L. Since q is a 
thought that embodies the concept arthritis*, q is not a thought that can be 
ascribed to A when he is in L. But if A cannot have this thought, then 
neither can he have any thought that has q as part of its content. It follows 
that A can neither have the thought expressed by (a2), nor the thought 
expressed by (a3), in the reasoning above. But if these thoughts are 
unavailable to A, then so is the reasoning that the argument attributes to 
him. The reasoning embodied in (a1) to (a4) cannot therefore be the basis of 
A’s false belief. 
  
We have shown that A’s false belief cannot consist in the judgment 
that p and q have the same content. For in order for A to have this thought, 
he must be able to think its two constituent thoughts in the same context, 
but by the argument’s own premise, this is something that he cannot do. But 
if A cannot make this judgment, then, as we have noted earlier, his mistake 
will have no bearing on the truth or falsity of T’. To make the point another 
way, all that T’ requires of A is that if he could entertain the question 
whether p and q are the same thought, then he would be able to know a 
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priori that they are not the same. Admittedly, the consequent of this 
conditional is not true of A. But neither is the antecedent. Consequently, the 
case described in the argument is not a genuine counterexample to T’. 
 
 Let us now return to the first point and see how we can give a 
different explanation of A’s mistake. This will help us to get clear on the 
content of A’s false belief. We have already ruled out one line of justification 
for A’s belief on the ground that it attributes to him a thought which, by 
hypothesis, he cannot have. This effectively limits the justification that A 
could have for belief to the following line of reasoning: 
 
(b1) p is the thought I express now with S 
(b2)  p was also the thought I expressed last week with S 
(b3) So the thought I express now with S is the same as the thought I 
expressed last week with S. 
 
On this theory, A’s mistake is to be found in (b2), the belief that p was the 
thought he expressed last week with the sentence “Arthritis was ___”. Since 
q was the thought that was expressed last week and q is a different thought 
from p, his belief is false. Also, it is clear that nothing that is available to A 
though introspection alone will reveal this mistake to him. Hence, this 
account is consistent with both of our initial concessions to the argument, 
first, that A will answer affirmatively if he relies on introspective evidence 
alone, and second, that he will be mistaken if he answers affirmatively. 
However, since no mistake of comparative judgment has been made by A 
on this account, we may conclude, as before, that the case is not a 
counterexample to T’. 
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 The case described by Falvey and Owens therefore fails to be 
counterexample to T’ because A cannot have a thought which contains both 
arthritis and arthritis* as constituents. But what if someone who is capable of 
having such a thought (call him B) is substituted for A in the argument? 
What effect will this have on the argument? First, if B can have thoughts 
about arthritis when in L*, and about arthritis* when in L, then there is 
nothing to prevent him from using the sentence “Arthritis is ___” to 
express the same thought in both L and L*. Therefore it cannot be 
presumed that B will be mistaken if he believes that the thought he now 
express is the same as the thought he expressed last week. Second, if B can 
have a thought which contains both arthritis and arthritis* as constituent, then 
it would be question-begging to insist that B is incapable of distinguishing 
the one concept from the other. But if B is capable of making this 
distinction, then it cannot be presumed that if he were to make a mistake in 
answering the question, he would not be able to uncover the mistake 
through introspection alone. 
  
Thus we may conclude that the argument given by Falvey and Owens 
is powerless against T’. For either the subject is in a position to make the 
required comparative judgment or he isn’t. If he is able to make the 
judgment, then the argument’s premises will be undermined. But if he is not 
able to do so, then his case will have no relevance to T’. Either way, the 
argument collapses. 
 
 In response to our criticism, our opponents might try to modify their 
argument as follows. Suppose that A’s community L has a word, say 
‘tarthritis’, which expresses the concept arthritis*. In L, then, ‘arthritis’ stands 
for arthritis and “tarthritis” stands for tarthritis (=arthritis*). However A is 
unaware of this difference and uses the two words interchangeably. For 
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instance, just as he would affirm “My arthritis has spread to my thigh”, he 
would also affirm “My tarthritis has spread to my thigh”, and conversely. 
Now suppose we ask A whether the thought he associates with “Arthritis is 
___” (S) is the same as the thought he associates with “Tarthritis is ___” 
(S^). Presumably he will answer yes. But since S and S^ do not express the 
same thought, A will be mistaken. Furthermore, no amount of introspection 
by A will reveal the mistake to him. Therefore T’ is false. 
  
But this argument too is inconclusive. In what follows, let p be the 
thought expressed by S, and q the thought expressed by S^, in the language 
of L. As before, let us assume that A will answer the question affirmatively. 
From this, we may infer that A believes that the thought he associates with S 
is the same as the one he associates with S^. But in order for the case to be a 
counterexample to T’, A’s belief must be false and it must be based upon a 
judgment of comparative content. However, neither of these requirements is 
clearly met. To see that this is so, suppose that A has arrived at his belief by 
reasoning as follows: 
 
(c1) q is the thought I associate with S. 
(c2) q is also the thought I associate with S^. 
(c3) So the thought I associate with S is the same as the thought I  
 associate with S^. 
 
Three points may be made about this piece of reasoning. First, none 
of the thoughts involved in it is a judgment of comparative content in the 
required sense. Second, one cannot deny the reasoning to A on the ground 
that the concept arthritis* does not exist in L, for by assumption it does. Nor 
can one deny it to A on the ground that S and S^ do have the same meaning 
in the language of L, for neither (c1) nor (c2) is a claim about what S or S^ 
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mean. Rather they are about what A means by these sentences, and clearly 
the two kinds of claims are independent of each other. It is therefore 
perfectly possible for both (c1) and (c2) to be true of A. Third, if the 
reasoning embodied in (c1)-(c3) is sound, then A’s belief, as given by his 
reply, will be true, not false. Since A’s belief need not be false in the 
situation described in the argument, this case, like the previous one, is not a 
counterexample to T’. 
 
Thus far, we have seen no decisive reason for thinking that there is 
any conflict between externalism1 and T’, let alone the weaker T. But there 
is another form of externalism, one which is driven by a different set of 
considerations from those which motivated externalism1. Perhaps, a better 
case against T can be built upon this form of externalism. 
 
II 
 
The first type of argument for externalism is based on the assumption 
that a subject can have a thought despite lacking a complete understanding 
of some concept in its content. This assumption is not essential to a second 
type of argument for externalism, of which the most famous example is 
undoubtedly Putnam’s Twin Earth argument. To briefly summarize, 
suppose that somewhere in the galaxy is a Twin-Earth that is exactly like 
Earth except in one respect. The one difference is that the liquid which 
people on Twin-Earth call ‘water’ is not H2O but a different liquid whose 
chemical formula may be abbreviated as XZY. Despite the difference in 
their microstructure, H2O and XZY are indistinguishable in terms of their 
observable properties. Let A be a scientifically ill-informed English speaker 
with a faultless understanding of the word ‘water’, and let B be his replica on 
Twin-Earth. By hypothesis, A and B have exactly same physical and mental 
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histories non-intensionally described. Yet when A utters the sentence 
“Water is wet” and B does the same, they express different beliefs. For A’s 
belief is true just in case H2O is wet, whereas B’s belief is true just in case 
XYZ is wet. It follows that even when a thought is fully grasped by a 
subject, its identity might not be completely determined by the subject’s 
intrinsic properties, but might be dependent upon factors which are external 
to the subject – in this case, the subject’s physical environment. I shall refer 
to this form of externalism as externalism2.  
 
 What implication does externalism2 have for T? Among philosophers 
who have considered this question, an overwhelming majority seem to think 
that we must abandon T if we accept externalism2. For convenience, I shall 
refer to this prevailing view as the incompatibility thesis. The central argument 
for the incompatibility thesis is the slow switching argument. I shall not, 
however, discuss this argument here as it is similar in structure to the earlier 
argument by Falvey and Owens and therefore open to the same objections. 
To establish the incompatibility thesis, an argument would have to show 
that if externalism2 were true, then no one, no matter how well informed, 
could know a priori that water and twater (the concept expressed by ‘water’ on 
Twin Earth) were different concepts. Such a conclusion is clearly beyond 
the reach of standard versions of the switching argument. 
 
The incompatibility thesis is unwarranted. In the context of this 
discussion, unless it can be shown that externalism2 entails that  
 
(O) No one can know a priori that water and twater are different concepts 
 
there will be no case for the incompatibility thesis. Since externalism2 is 
entailed by the Twin Earth argument, any proposition that is derivable from 
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externalism2 must be derivable from that argument. But O cannot be 
derived from the premises of the Twin Earth argument. Hence O is not 
entailed by externalism2 and the incompatibility thesis is unfounded.  
 
To see that the Twin Earth argument does not entail O, we need first 
to state the argument. The basic argument for externalism2 is as follows: 
 
(A1) Concept determines extension. 
(A2) The extension of ‘water’ is different on Earth and Twin Earth. 
(A3) So water and twater are different concepts. 
(A4) Twins (such as A and B) share all their intrinsic properties. 
(A5) So the concept water is not fixed by the intrinsic properties of a  
 competent speaker.  
 
If O is a consequence of the Twin Earth argument, then it must be 
derivable from the set {(A1), (A2), (A4)} (plus various common background 
assumptions). In what follows, let C be an ideal interpreter who has a 
perfect grasp of the concepts water and twater but no knowledge of the 
relevant chemistry, and let 
  
 p = water and twater are different concepts.  
q = twater is not water.  
 
From (A1) it follows that q entails p. If we assume that C knows this 
entailment and knowledge is closed under known entailment, we can 
deduce, by the following steps, that if C knows that q, then C knows that p: 
 
(B1) If [C knows that q and C knows that q entails p], then C knows that  
p. 
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(B2)  C knows that q entails p. 
(B3)  So if C knows that q, then C knows that p. 
 
And from (B3) we may derived  
 
(B4) If C can know a priori that q, then C can know a priori that p. 
 
But there is no valid inference from (B4) to the proposition that C cannot 
know a priori that p. Thus O is not derivable from (A1). Nor is O derivable 
from the other two premises. This needs no argument in the case of (A2), 
since the premise makes no mention of concepts. This same applies to (A4). 
To get O, (A4) must be combined with the assumption that only concepts 
that are intrinsically determined can satisfy T. But such a move would clearly 
be question begging, as the assumption is just a re-statement of the 
incompatibility thesis. Since O cannot be derived from the set of premises 
which yield externalism2, it cannot be a consequence of externalism2. The 
incompatibility thesis is therefore unwarranted.  
 
 Why then have philosophers like Putnam and McGinn been so ready 
to accept the incompatibility thesis? I suspect that part of the explanation 
has to do with their belief that the only type of theory of meaning that could 
square with the results of the Twin Earth argument is a multiple component 
theory. On Putnam’s own theory, the meaning of ‘water’ is envisaged as an 
ordered-pair consisting of (a) the stereotype - a qualitative description of a 
normal sample of water, and (b) its extension. If one extends this account of 
meaning to concepts, then it’s fairly easy to construct a valid argument for 
O. Thus let the concept water be represented by <s1, e1> and the concept 
twater by <s2, e2>, where s1 and s2 are the respective stereotypes, and e1 
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and e2, the respective extensions. To establish O, a preliminary step is to 
establish that if p then q: 
 
(C1) water = <s1, e1> and twater = <s2, e2>. 
(C2) s1 = s2 
(C3) So water = twater if and only if e1 = e2. 
(C4) So if p then q 
 
The next step is to assume that C knows (C4) and that his knowledge 
is closed under known implication. Then, by a similar argument to (B1)-
(B4), we get the result that  
 
(C5) If C can know a priori that p, then C can know a priori that q. 
 
From (C5), it is a sure step to O by modus ponens, given the undeniable 
fact that C cannot know a priori that q. 
 
Although this line of thought may explain why so many philosophers 
subscribe to the incompatibility thesis, it doesn’t justify the thesis because of 
the unsupported assumption that the two-component theory of meaning 
comes with externalism2. From our earlier discussion, it should be clear that 
such an assumption is unsustainable. For what the Twin Earth argument 
shows is no more than this: that the meaning of a NK term is not 
determined by the intrinsic properties of a person who fully understands the 
term. From this, it logically follows that the concept that is associated with 
such a term in the language must have an external determinant. But the 
proposition that such a concept has an external determinant is weaker than 
the proposition that the external determinant of such a concept is the 
extension, which in turn is weaker, being less specific, than the proposition 
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that the extension is a component of the concept. Thus, we see that the 
two-component theory is not a consequence of externalism2.  
 
To reinforce the conclusion that we have just reached, I will argue 
that there is an alternative account of NK terms which is consistent with 
externalism2, but which does not imply that terms which are associated with 
different concepts must have different extensions. This account is suggested 
by the following remark of Putnam:  “[M]y ways of recognizing water (my 
‘operational definition’, so to speak) …., like the ostensive one, is simply a 
way of pointing out a standard – pointing out the stuff in the actual world 
such that for x to be water, in any world, is for x to bear the relation sameL 
to normal members of the class of entities that satisfies the operational 
definition. ‘Water’ on Twin Earth is not water, even if it satisfies the 
operational definition, because it doesn’t bear sameL to the local stuff that 
satisfies the operational definition, and local stuff that satisfies the 
operational definition but has a different microstructure different from the 
rest of the local stuff that satisfies the operational definition isn’t water 
either, because it doesn’t bear sameL to the normal examples of the local 
‘water’.” (p. 232 [3]) These remarks open up an account of NK concepts 
which is altogether different from the two-component theory.   
 
The meaning of ‘water’ is a concept – a thing that determines an 
extension without the aid of contexts. The meaning of an indexical 
expression, on the other hand, is a function from context to extension. The 
word ‘water’ cannot therefore be regarded as an abbreviation of a complex 
indexical expression such as ‘the local stuff that is transparent, etc.’ But 
although an indexical word type is not coupled with any concept, its tokens 
can be used to express different concepts in different contexts. This is 
essentially Frege’s view of indexicals. “With words like ‘here’ and ‘there’,” 
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Frege observes, “the merely wording, as it is given in writing, is not the 
complete expression of the thought, but the knowledge of certain 
accompanying conditions of utterance, which are used as means of 
expressing the thought, are needed for its correct apprehension.” (p 94 [7]) 
Thus the same sentence containing the word ‘here’ will express different 
thoughts when uttered at different places, of which some may be true, 
others false. What is expressed by the word ‘here’ in these various utterances 
must, accordingly, be different. (For a forceful defence of Frege’s theory, see 
Gareth Evans’s Understanding Demonstratives). 
 
We are now is a position to state the indexical theory of NK terms. On 
this theory, our concept of water would be a condition that could only be 
expressed by a clause containing an indexical expression, such as the 
following: 
 
(W) (∀L)(“water” is true of L iff L bears the same liquid relation as the  
local stuff which is transparent, colourless, odourless, etc.) 
 
When we use W to fix the extension of “water”, we express a condition K1 
that is satisfied by a liquid if and only if the liquid has the chemical structure 
of water. Thus K1 applies to water but not to twater. Note that this fact is 
independent of contexts. Any expression that has K1 as its associated 
concept will be true of water but not of twater, regardless of where the 
expression is uttered. K1 is therefore not a function from contexts to 
reference, but a complete concept. In contrast, when W is used by Twin 
Earth speakers to fix the extension of their word ‘water’, what they express 
is a condition K2 that is satisfied by twater but not water. It follows that K1 
is not the same concept as K2. A plausible thought is that K1 is the concept 
water and K2 is the concept twater. Thus, like the two-component theory, this 
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theory has the welcomed consequence that water and twater are different 
concepts. 
 
However, there are two crucial differences between the two theories. 
The first is that the indexical theory, unlike the two-component theory, does 
not carry the assumption that C could not know that water and twater were 
different concepts without knowing that they had different extensions. To 
see this, consider a parallel case: two utterances of “The local water is hard”, 
one made in London and the other in Reading. In each context, “the local 
water” means: the total sample of water around here. Hence, the two utterances 
do not express the same thought, for one might be true and the other false. 
Given what the term “the local water” means in each context, its extension 
will not be the same in the two utterances. But it is nevertheless possible for 
the water in one total sample to stand in the “same liquid” relation to the 
water in the other total sample. Hence, the fact that a different thought is 
expressed by each of the two utterances is compatible with the supposition 
that the local water in London and the local water in Reading are of the 
same kind of stuff. 
 
The same consideration can be made (with the necessary enlargement 
of the scope of “local”) with respect to two utterances of W, one on Earth 
and the other on Twin Earth. In each case, the reference of “local” is part of 
the expression of the condition that is expressed by the utterance. Since the 
reference of “local’ is different in each utterance, the condition expressed by 
W on Earth is different from the condition expressed by W on Twin Earth. 
However, given the form of W, the extensions of “water” and “twater” will 
not be particular samples of stuff, but kinds of stuff, so that a liquid can be 
water (or twater) even if it is not located on Earth (or Twin Earth). But the 
crucial point is this: on this account, even if the extension of “water” and 
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“twater” were the same, the meaning of the two words would still be 
different. The difference between water and twater therefore need not be tied 
to any fact about the real nature of twater and water. But if the difference in 
the two concepts may be independent of their extensions, then there is no 
conclusive ground for the claim that C could not know that twater and water 
are different concepts without knowing that twater is not water.   
 
The second difference between the two accounts of meaning is this. 
On the two-component theory, the concept linked to the word “water” is 
not fully known to a competent speaker, for a component of the concept – 
the extension – is not part of this knowledge. On the indexical theory, the 
concept water - the condition expressed by tokens of an indexical sentence 
like W on Earth – is fully grasped by a competent speaker. This has an 
important consequence for our present concern. Let R1 and R2 be the 
references of “local” in an utterance of W on Earth and an utterance of W 
on Twin Earth, respectively. Now it is true that C would not know that water 
and twater were different concepts if he did not know that R1 was not the 
same as R2, and C could not know that R1 was different from R2 without 
empirical investigation. But it does not follow from this that C could not 
know a priori that water and twater were different concepts. This is because, 
on this account, no one could grasp the concepts water and twater unless he 
knew that R1 was not the same as R2. Hence although this piece of 
knowledge is a posteriori, it is not extraneous to C’s understanding of the 
question “Is water the same concept as twater?” We see once again that 
externalism2 does not support O. 
 
I would like to end this section by showing how C can know a priori 
that water and twater are different concepts. This will strengthen our 
contention that O is logically independent of externalism2. One way in 
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which C can arrive at the knowledge that water and twater are distinct 
concepts is by reasoning along the lines of the following argument: 
 
(D1) Water and twater are the same concept just in case the ‘water’ on Earth 
is synonymous with “water” on Twin Earth. 
(D2) If ‘water’ on Earth is synonymous with ‘water’ on Twin Earth, then it 
will be an analytic truth that twater is water. 
(D3) If it is an analytic truth that twater is water, then it will be knowable a  
priori that twater is water. 
(D4) It is not knowable a priori that twater is water. 
(D5) Hence ‘water’ on Earth is not synonymous with ‘water’ on Twin- 
Earth. 
(D6) Hence water and twater are different concepts. 
 
If this argument is sound, then C knows that p (D6), since he has 
arrived at it by correct reasoning.  But since none of the premises requires C 
to know that “water” has a different extension on Earth and Twin Earth, it 
follows that C could know that p without knowing that q. Also if the 
argument’s premises are all knowable a priori, then C’s knowledge of p will 
be a priori. I believe that both of these requirements are met by the argument 
(D1-D6). Moreover, none of its premises are in obvious conflict with 
externalism2. This shows, once again, that externalism2 does not entail the 
claim that C cannot know a priori that water and twater are different concepts. 
 
To sum up, the incompatibility thesis is warranted only if the claim 
that no one can know a priori that water and twater are different concepts is 
entailed by externalism2. But externalism2 does not have this consequence. 
There might be versions of externalism, such as one which incorporates a 
two component conception of meaning, which are incompatible with T, but 
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these are not obtainable from the existing arguments for externalism. 
Therefore we may conclude that the incompatibility thesis, though widely 
believed, is groundless. 
 
III 
 
In The Meaning of “Meaning”, Putnam maintains that the 
traditional theory of meaning – “the theory that (1) words have ‘intensions’ 
which are something like concepts associated with words by speakers, and 
that (2) intension determines extension – cannot be true of natural-kind 
words like ‘water’.” (p. 234 [3]) I believe that Putnam did not succeeded in 
establishing this claim in his paper. To support my case, I rely on the results 
of sections (I) and (II). 
 
The basic argument for Putnam’s claim can be put in the form of a 
dilemma: 
 
(A1) Either the concept water is “in the head” or it is not. 
(A2) If it is “in the head”, then it cannot determine extension. 
(A3) If it is not “in the head”, then it cannot be what a C knows when he 
 understands the word ‘water’. 
(A4) So either the concept water cannot determine extension or it cannot  
be what C knows when he understands the word ‘water’. 
 
There are several interpretations of the term “in the head’ which are 
consistent with Putnam’s intentions in The Meaning of “Meaning” and 
elsewhere. For present purposes, we need only consider the following two: 
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(a) An item is in the head just in case it is fully determined by the subject’s 
internal properties. 
(b) An item is in the head just in case it is transparent (in the sense required 
by T). 
 
From our earlier discussion, it should be clear that (a) and (b) are not 
logically equivalent. Let’s see how the argument fair under each 
interpretation. 
 
If we interpret “in the head” in accordance with (a), then (A2) is true 
(assuming externalism). But (A3) is not true, for from the assumption that 
water is not wholly determined by the intrinsic properties of a speaker, it 
does not follow that water is not completely grasped by such a speaker when 
he understands the word ‘water’. To motivate this result, one will have to 
assume that the chemical facts about water are somehow involved in the 
concept water, but this assumption has been shown to be gratuitous. On the 
other hand, if we interpret “in the head” in accordance with (b), then (A3) is 
true (assuming T). But (A2) is now false, for as we have shown, water need 
not fail to be transparent if satisfies externalism2, and if water satisfies 
extensalism2, then it does determine extension. Hence, it appears that 
whichever interpretation is put on the expression “in the head”, Putnam’s 
argument against the traditional theory of meaning is unsound. 
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